Qualitative Coalitional Games (QCGs) are a variant of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. Our goal in this paper is to develop and study logics for reasoning about QCGs. We begin by introducing a logic for reasoning about "static" QCGs, where participants play a single game, and we then introduce and study Temporal QCGs (TQCGs), i.e., games in which a sequence of QCGs is played. In order to represent and reason about such games, we introduce a linear time temporal logic of QCGs, called L(TQCG). We give a complete axiomatisation of L(TQCG), use it to investigate the properties of TQCGs, identify its expressive power, establish its complexity, characterise classes of TQGCs with formulas from our logical language, and use it to formulate several (temporal) solution concepts for TQCGs.
Introduction
There has recently been much interest in the development of logics for reasoning about game theoretic concepts [18] . One of the key reasons for this interest is that game theory is seen as one of the theoretical underpinnings to the multi-agent systems field [14, 19] , and it is therefore very natural to consider the development of knowledge representation formalisms for game-like scenarios.
In this paper we focus on Qualitative Coalitional Games (QCGs) [20] , a variation of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied. Every coalition in a QCG has available to it a set of choices, where each choice is the set of goals that would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. The overall aim of this paper is to develop and study logics for reasoning about QCGs, in much the same way that logics for conventional coalitional games were studied in [1] .
We begin, in the following section, with a short introduction to QCGs. In section 2.1 we define a logic for expressing properties of QCGs. We investigate the expressive power of this logic, defining a notion of simulation between QCGs and proving that the satisfaction of formulae of QCG logic is invariant under simulation. We give a complete axiomatization of the logic, and study the relationship between the logic and conventional modal logic.
We then go on to study iterated QCGs. The study of repeated games now forms a major component of the game theory literature [12, pp.133-161] . Perhaps the best-known example of such a repeated game is the iterated prisoners' dilemma, which has for example been studied both analytically [5, pp.353-358] and by means of competitions [4] . A standard distinction is made between iterated games with a finite horizon (which are repeated a fixed, pre-determined, commonly known number of times), and those with an infinite horizon (which are repeated infinitely often). These two types of iterated games tend to have rather different properties: repeated games with a finite horizon can often be treated as "large one shot games", while infinite horizon games often cannot be treated in this way. For example, in the finite horizon version of the prisoner's dilemma, a standard backward induction argument tells us that the dominant strategy is to defect at every round, and hence mutual cooperation seems as unpromising in such repeated games as it does in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma; in contrast, if the game has an infinite horizon, then mutual cooperation becomes a Nash equilibrium [5, p.358] .
Given the role of game theory as a theoretical foundation of multi-agent systems, it seems that repeated games are of particular importance to the field. By-and-large, we are not interested in building multi-agent systems that will operate in a "one-shot" fashion: we typically want them to operate over time, often without a pre-defined termination time. Moreover, given the important role that coalitional games play in multi-agent systems [15, 16] , it seems that repeated coalitional games are also likely to be of significance. However, comparatively little research has considered repeated coalitional games, or coalitional games played over time [10] . In particular, while there has been some work on formalising logical reasoning about coalitional games [1] , little work focus on formalising reasoning about repeated coalitional games.
We therefore introduce Temporal QCGs (TQCGs): games in which QCGs are played repeatedly. In order to represent and reason about such games, we introduce L(TQCG), a linear time temporal logic of QCGs. We give a complete axiomatisation of L(TQCG), characterise its expressive power with respect to a type of simulation between TQCGs, establish the computational complexity of satisfiability for TQCGs, investigate the properties of TQCGs by characterising them as formulae in L(TQCG) and finally characterise some solution concepts of TQCGs in L(TQCG).
Qualitative Coalitional Games
We give a brief introduction to Qualitative Coalitional Games (QCGs): details may be found in [20] . A QCG contains a (non-empty, finite) set A ={1,...,n} of agents. Each agent i ∈ A is assumed to have associated with it a (finite) set G i of goals, drawn from a set of overall possible goals G. The intended interpretation is that the members of G i represent all the individual rational outcomes for i -intuitively, the outcomes that give it "better than zero utility". That is, agent i would be happy if any member of G i were achieved -then it has "gained something". But, in QCGs, we are not concerned with preferences over individual goals. Thus, at this level of modelling, i is indifferent among the members of G i : it will be satisfied if at least one member of G i is achieved, and unsatisfied otherwise. Note that cases where more than one of an agent's goals are satisfied are not an issue -an agent's aim will simply be to ensure that at least one of its goals is achieved, and there is no sense of an agent i attempting to satisfy as many members of G i as possible.
A coalition, typically denoted by C, is simply a set of agents, i.e., a subset of A. The grand coalition is the set of all agents, A. We assume that each possible coalition has available to it a set of possible choices, where each choice intuitively characterises the outcome of one way that the coalition could cooperate. We model the choices available to coalitions via a characteristic function with the signature V : 2 A → 2 2 G . Thus, in saying that G ∈ V(C ) for some coalition C ⊆ A, we are saying that one choice available to the coalition C is to bring about exactly the goals in G. At this point, the reader might expect to see some constraints placed on characteristic functions. For example, at first sight the following monotonicity constraint might seem natural: C ⊆ C implies V(C ) ⊆ V(C ). Although such a constraint is entirely appropriate for many scenarios, there are cases where such a constraint is not appropriate 1 . Bringing these components together, a qualitative coalitional game (QCG) is a tuple:
where:
• A ={1,...,n} is a finite, non-empty set of agents;
• G is a finite, non-empty set of possible goals; 
We will make use of 1 in later examples.
A Logic for QCGs
A logic tailor made for expressing properties of individual QCGs has not been formalised before. We now introduce such a logic. This logic will later be used as the assertion language, or state language, for the temporal logic we develop in section 3. The language is defined in two parts: L c is the satisfaction language, and is used to express properties of choices made by agents. The basic constructs in this language are of the form sat i , meaning "agent i is satisfied". The overall language L(QCG) is used for expressing properties of QCGs themselves. The main construct in this language is of the form C ϕ, where ϕ is a formula of the satisfaction language, and means that C have a choice such that this choice makes ϕ true. For example, 3 (sat 1 ∧sat 4 ) will mean that 3 has a choice that simultaneously satisfies agents 1 and 4.
Formally, the grammar ϕ c defines the satisfaction language L c , while ϕ q defines the QCG language L(QCG).
where i ∈ A and C ⊆ A. (We note some similarities between our logical language L(QCG) and Pauly's language for axiomatizing judgement aggregation procedures [13] , although the motivation and use of the languages are quite different.)
We use the usual derived propositional connectives (∧, →, ↔) for both languages L c and L(QCG), and in addition write [C ]ϕ to abbreviate ¬ C ¬ϕ. The formula [C ]ϕ will be defined to be true exactly when ϕ is a necessary consequence of the coalition C making a choice; ϕ will be true no matter which choice the coalition makes. When C ={a} is a singleton, we sometimes write a and [a] for C and
, the satisfaction relation ,G |= Q ϕ is defined as follows:
..,G n ,V is a QCG and ϕ is a L(QCG) formula, |= Q ϕ is defined as follows:
Example 2 Let 1 be as in Example 1. Then:
Summarising, the satisfaction of agents is evaluated against a set of goals, while Boolean combinations of expressions referring to choices of coalitions are evaluated on a QCG Game . The latter combinations will be the atomic assertions in our temporal framework of Section 3.
Expressive Power of L(QCG)
We now address the question of which properties of QCGs are definable in our language. It is clear from our language definition that what L(QCG) can express is which coalition can satisfy which set of agents concurrently. Note that we are not interested in how the coalitions make certain sets of agents satisfied, nor why an agent is satisfied (i.e., which goal satisfied him). We will now demonstrate that the properties of QCGs we can express in the language L(QCG) are exactly the properties closed under a notion of QCG-simulation. In other words, the language cannot differentiate two games and iff they QCG-simulate each other.
Obviously, equivalence of models transcends mere isomorphism. In particular, the semantics of performing a choice seem to depend only on which agents are satisfied by the choice. For example, one could imagine a mapping from goals in one model to "equivalent" goals of the other, maybe collapsing two goals of the former model into one goal of the latter. However, such a relation between models does not capture all instances of equivalent models. What is needed is a relation between sets of goals. This motivates the following definition of a QCG-simulation as a relation between two models. It is only necessary to relate goals that can actually be chosen by some coalition. Furthermore, it only makes sense to relate models that are defined over the same set of agents.
A relation
is a QCG-simulation between two QCGs = A,G,G 1 ,...,G n ,V and = A,G ,G 1 ,...,G n ,V iff the following conditions hold for all coalitions C.
If there exists a QCG-simulation between two games and , we write . If , we can simulate any choice in one model with a choice in the other, and vice versa. This notion of simulation is somewhat similar to the notion of "alternating simulation" between alternating transition systems in [3] . 
Example 3 Let
2 . The relation Z consisting of the following pairs is a QCG-simulation between 1 and 2 .
Note that Z is not a function, nor the inverse of a function.
We write
Theorem 1 Satisfaction is invariant under QCG-simulation:
for any ψ by induction over ψ. For the base case, let ψ = sat i . ,G |= Q ψ iff G i ∩G =∅ iff, by the satisfaction condition, G i ∩G =∅ iff ,G |= Q ψ. The inductive step (negation and disjunction) is straightforward. We now show that
for any ϕ by induction on ϕ. For the base case, let ϕ = C ψ. For the direction to the right, if (1), ,G |= Q ψ, and thus |= Q ϕ. The direction to the left is symmetric: if |= Q ϕ there is a G ∈ V (C) such that ,G |= Q ψ; by surjectivity of Z there is a G ∈ V(C) such that GZG ; and by (1) ,G |= Q ψ and thus |= Q ϕ. The inductive step (negation and disjunction) is straightforward.
The obvious question now is whether every pair of equivalent models are connected by a QCG-simulation. The answer is "yes".
Theorem 2 If , are defined over the same set of agents, then:
We define a QCG-simulation Z :
as follows: for every coalition C and pair of choices
Similarly, we must show that Z is surjective, i.e., that if
Finally, we show that the satisfaction condition holds.
Axiomatisation for QCGs
We define a Hilbert style axiomatisation of qualitative coalitional games, and prove its soundness and completeness. In the next section we then relate the logic to modal logic. We name our axiomatisation for QCGs K(QCG). This name emphasises the close resemblance to the modal system K, which also indicates that our logic, is in a sense, a weakest basic system for QCGs, to which more sophisticated constraints can easily be added -such extensions are the topic of Section 4. The system K(QCG) over the language L(QCG) is defined as follows, where ϕ,ψ are arbitrary L(QCG) formulae, α,β are arbitrary L c formulae and C an arbitrary coalition:
It is easy to see that the deduction theorem holds for K(QCG). We will need the following properties of K(QCG). The proofs are straightforward for readers familiar with modal logic.
Proof. For soundness (the direction to the left), it is easy to see that the axioms are valid, and that the rules preserve logical consequence. For completeness, let ⊆ L(QCG) be K(QCG) consistent. We show that is satisfied by some QCG. Let A be the set of agents and let n =|A|. Let be a L(QCG) maximal and K(QCG) consistent set containing (the proof of existence of such a set is the standard proof of Lindenbaum's lemma). We now construct = A,G,G 1 ,...,G n ,V , intended to satisfy , as follows:
We show that
for any γ by structural induction over γ . For the base case, γ = C α for some α ∈ L c . Again, we use induction on the structure of α. For the (nested) base case, let α = sat i . For the direction to the right, if |= Q γ then there is an X ∈ V(C) such that ,X |= Q α, i.e., there is an X ⊆ G such that C ξ X ∈ and X ∩{sat i } =∅. Thus, sat i ∈ X , and by Lemma 1.1, γ = C sat i ∈ . For the direction to the left, let C sat i ∈ . Let
and thus C ξ S ∪{sat i } ∈ for some S ⊆ A. It follows that S ∪{sat i }∈ V(C), and since , (S ∪{sat i }) |= Q sat i we get that |= Q C sat i which concludes the proof of the direction to the left in the innermost induction proof. Both the inner and the outer induction steps (negation and disjunction) are straightforward.
Note that the completeness proofs demonstrate that we do not need to represent multiple ways of satisfying an agent: one "satisfaction symbol" for each agent is enough.
The Non-Normal Modal Logic K(QCG)
Formulae of our language can be seen as formulae of modal logic. In this view, the logic K(QCG) is a modal logic. Particularly, K(QCG) is a non-normal modal logic (cf., e.g., [6] ): it is not closed, with respect to the language of modal logic, under the syntactic closure conditions of normal modal logics -for example it does not contain all instances of the K axiom, or even all instances of propositional tautologies. In this section we make the relationship between our logic and modal logic precise.
Let L be the (multi-)modal language over propositions ={sat i : i ∈ A} with one diamond C for each coalition C, defined in the usual way [6] . As a modal language, L allows, e.g., arbitrary nesting of diamonds. Clearly, L(QCG) ⊂ L.
Let n =|A| be the number of agents and m = 2 n the number of coalitions. The modal language L, and corresponding logical systems and semantic structures discussed below, are parameterised by m and , which are henceforth taken as implicit.
K(QCG) is the modal system K (again, we omit the usual suffix m) with axioms and rules restricted to formulae from L(QCG): essentially formulae with modal rank equal to one and no occurrence of an atomic proposition outside the scope of a modal operator. So is the logic K(QCG) the logic K restricted to the language L(QCG), i.e., is a theorem of K in this restricted language also a theorem of K(QCG)? Although the theorem (of K) itself is in L(QCG), it does not automatically mean that every formula in the K-proof of the theorem is in L(QCG) and thus that the theorem is also a theorem of K(QCG). Intuitively though, the answer to the question might seem to be positive, and we will return to it shortly. First we go on to compare semantics of the two logics.
We can interpret our language L(QCG) in a Kripke structure M = (S,R C 1 ,...,R C m ,π ) where π : S → 2 . To avoid confusion, we use the symbol |= K for satisfaction/validity wrt. Kripke structures and use |= Q for QCGs.
We first define a mapping f from the class of QCGs to the class of Kripke structures.
is the smallest structure satisfying the following conditions:
• S contains a state t, called the initial state
Lemma 2 For all ϕ ∈ L(QCG) and any QCG ,
Proof. We first show that for any
The inductive step (negation and disjunction) is straightforward. The main proof is by induction on ϕ. Let f( ) = (M,t). For the base case,
The inductive step (negation and disjunction) is straightforward.
We next define a mapping g from the class of pointed Kripke structures for n agents over to the class of QCGs. Let M = (S,R C 1 ,...,R C m ,π) and s ∈ S. g(M,s) = , where = A,G,G 1 ,...,G n ,V is defined as follows:
Lemma 3 For all Kripke structures M, states s in M and formulae
The proof is by induction on ψ. For the base case, (M ,s ) |= K sat i iff sat i ∈ π(s ) iff π(s )∩ {sat i } =∅ iff ,π(s ) |= Q sat i . The inductive step (negation and disjunction) is straightforward.
The main proof is by induction on ϕ. For the base case, (M,s)
Lemmas 3 and 2 can be illustrated in the following diagram, where ≈ denotes logical equivalence between structures:
Thus, QCGs can (in the context of our logic) be seen as a certain type of Kripke structures, and the other way around. This also immediately answers the conjecture that K(QCG) and K coincides for our language L(QCG).
Theorem 4
For all formulae ϕ ∈ L(QCG)
The direction to the right is immediate: the theorems of K(QCG) are theorems of K since the axioms of K(QCG) are strictly included in the axioms of K and every rule application admissible in K(QCG) is also admissible in K.
For the direction to the left, let K ϕ. By completeness of K, |= K ϕ. Let be an arbitrary QCG. f( ) |= K ϕ, and by Lemma 2 |= Q ϕ. Thus, |= Q ϕ. By completeness of K(QCG) (Theorem 3), K(QCG) ϕ.
While these results show a strong relationship between the logic of qualitative coalitional games and modal logic, there are important differences. Particularly, K(QCG) has a qualitative coalitional game semantics, but the modal logic K(QCG) (over the modal language L) does not have a Kripke semantics. To be more precise: K(QCG) is not a complete modal logic with respect to any class of Kripke models or frames. As a modal logic, completeness of K(QCG) is defined in terms of the full language L of modal logic, rather than just the restricted language L(QCG). For example, for any p ∈ the formula p∨¬p (a formula in the language L) is valid on all such mentioned classes, but cannot be derived using the axioms and rules of K(QCG). • N ={1,...,m} is a non-empty set of players (or agents);
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• is a non-empty set of outcomes;
is the characteristic function of , which for every non-empty coalition C defines the choices V(C) available to C; and • i ⊆ × is a complete, reflexive, and transitive preference relation, for each agent i ∈ N.
Overlooking the fact that the characteristic function for coalitional games is not defined for the empty coalition, we can view QCGs as CGs: take = 2 G (possible outcomes equals possible combinations of goal satisfaction) and X 1 i X 2 iff X 1 ∩G i =∅⇒ X 2 ∩G i =∅ (X 1 is as least as good as X 2 for agent i iff satisfaction in X 2 implies satisfaction in X 1 ). In [1] , Coalitional Game Logic (CGL) is introduced, for reasoning about (general) coalitional games. The syntax and semantics of CGL is quite similar to the logic introduced above; in particular the language is defined in two stages and only one level of modal nesting is allowed. A difference is that CGL has explicit references to outcomes in the language. The semantics, and implicitly the language, of CGL is defined as follows, where is a coalitional game and ω an outcome in :
CGL is very expressive (at least when it comes to finite games such as QCGs). We could certainly have used it for the purpose of expressing properties of QCGs. However, CGL is a very general language for arbitrary coalitional games, and not very well suited for the special case of QCGs. For example, to express the sat i proposition, we would have to write something like
Alternatively, a formula such as C sat i can be expressed as
However, expressing properties of QCGs in CGL has two big disadvantages. First, formulae such as those above are defined relative to a given QCG. Different QCGs would give different formulae. Thus, the formulae above illustrate only a very weak form of logical characterisations of game properties. Second, the formulae above are exponentially long in the number of goals in the QCG. The language L(QCG), on the other hand, is tailor made for QCGs.
Temporal QCGs
In principle there are many ways to temporalise QCGs. As a first investigation, we assume a linear time model, in which, at each time point, a (possibly different) QCG is played. A temporal qualitative coalitional game (TQCG) is then a triple
M = S,σ,Q
• S is a set of states; We will make just an additional restriction: that the set of agents and overall goals remains the same in all states. Formally, ∀s,t ∈ S:
. This does not mean that an agent's goals must remain fixed, however: we allow for the possibility that an agent has different goals in different states. We also admit the possibility of a coalition having different choices in different states. Since the sets of agents and overall goals are fixed across all states, we will simply denote these by A and G respectively, omitting the state index.
A Logic for TQCGs
To express properties of TQCGs, we extend the QCG language L(QCG) with the standard temporal operators of linear-time temporal logic: g -"next", ♦ -"eventually", -"always in the future", and U -"until" [11] . Formally, the formulae ϕ t of the language L(TQCG) are defined as follows.
where the formulae ϕ c of the satisfaction language are defined as before. We again assume the usual derived propositional connectives, in addition to ♦ϕ for U ϕ and ϕ for ¬♦¬ϕ.
Moreover, we define * ϕ as (ϕ ∧ ϕ) (ϕ is true now and always in the future), and ♦ * ϕ = ¬ * ¬ϕ (ϕ is true now or sometime in the future). When M = (S,σ,Q) is a TQCG, u ∈ N, and ϕ is a L(TQCG) formula, the satisfaction relation M,u |= T ϕ is defined as follows:
For instance, the following formula of L(TQCG) means that eventually, agent 3 can always choose to satisfy agents 1 and 4 simultaneously:
We will henceforth use L(TQCG) to refer to both the language, and the logic we have defined over this language.
An Example
We illustrate the logic by a small example. We focus here on temporal properties of goal satisfaction, rather than on contrasting the power of different coalitions (i.e., on which coalitions are likely to form). The latter type of properties are discussed in detail in Section 4.
We model the following situation by a temporal qualitative coalitional game. Two agents 1 and 2 both need to use the same resource, say a web service, from time to time. Sometimes an agent needs read access, and sometimes it needs write access. The integrity of the web service is violated if at the same time either i) both read and write accesses are granted (inconsistent reads), ii) two write accesses are granted (inconsistent writes) or iii) no read access and no write access are granted (inefficiency).
Let M = (S,σ,Q) be a TQCG where S is some infinite set of states, and σ and Q are such that the following holds for Q(σ (k)) = A,G,G
for any k ≥ 0:
• A ={1,2,sys}. We model the agents as players 1 and 2, and the web service as player sys ("the system").
• G ={r,w 1 ,w 2 ,ok}. That each of these goals are achieved means that right now:
r : every client is granted read access w i : agent i is granted write access ok : the integrity of the system is not violated
if k mod 5 = 0 {r,w 1 } otherwise Agent 1 needs to have write access at every fifth point in time. At any other point in time, it is happy as long as it is not left idle, i.e., if it has either read or write access.
• G σ (k) 2 = {w 2 } if k mod 3 = 0 {r,w 2 } otherwise Agent 2's goals are similar to agent 1's, except that it needs write access at every third instead of fifth time point.
• G σ (k) sys ={ok}. The system is satisfied if the integrity is not violated. Note that G σ (k) sys does not depend on k; the system's goal does not vary over time.
• V σ (k) ({sys}) = ∅,{w 1 ,ok},{w 2 ,ok},{r,ok}, {w 1 ,w 2 },{w 1 ,r},{w 2 ,r},{w 1 ,w 2 ,r} . The web service can satisfy certain sets of goals. These sets does not necessarily include the goal that the integrity is not violated. We have implicitly defined what the desired behaviour of the system is: each choice involving ok implements a choice in which the integrity invariant is not violated. Note that the choices available to the system do not vary over time. In this example we don't care about V s (C) when C is a coalition different from {sys} (proper coalitional ability will be studied in Section 4).
The following properties hold in M,1.
1.
sys sat sys . The system can maintain integrity. 2.
( sys sat 1 ∧ sys sat 2 ). Agent 1 can always be satisfied by the system, and the same for agent 2.
3.
sys (sat 1 ∧sat 2 ). Agents 1 and 2 can always be simultaneously satisfied by the system. 4 . ♦¬ sys (sat 1 ∧sat 2 ∧sat sys ). The system cannot always satisfy agents 1 and 2 simultaneously without violating the integrity of the system. 5.
sys ¬sat 1 . The system can keep agent 1 unsatisfied forever. 6.
♦ sys (¬sat 1 ∧¬sat 2 ∧sat sys ). It is infinitely often the case that the system can make agents 1 and 2 unsatisfied at the same time without violating integrity (this happens at multiples of fifteen). 7. sys (¬sat 1 ∧¬sat 2 ∧sat sys )U ¬ sys (sat 1 ∧sat 2 ∧sat sys ). At some point in the future (i.e., u = 15), the system is unable to jointly satisfy agents 1 and 2 without violating integrity. Up until that time, sys is always able to make agents 1 and 2 jointly unsatisfied (note that we evaluate the formula in M,1).
where ψ = sys (¬sat 1 ∧¬sat 2 ∧sat sys ). The system can make agents 1 and 2 jointly unsatisfied without violating integrity at time points that are multiples of fifteen, and at no other time points.
As a final point, observe that from a logical point of view, the situations at time points 3 and 5 are indistinguishable:
This once again demonstrates that our logic abstracts away from how a coalition satisfies individuals: obviously, to satisfy agent 1 for instance, sys has to make different choices in σ (3) from those in σ (5).
Expressive Power of TQCGs
The notion of simulation for QCGs (Section 2.2) can be naturally lifted to the temporal case. When M = (S,σ,Q) and M = (S ,σ ,Q ) are TQCGS and k ≥ 0, we define
The notion of elementary equivalence for TQCGS over the language L(TQCG) can be defined as follows.
Theorem 5 For all TQCGs M,M : M T M ⇔ M ≡ M
Note that in the temporal case, the fact that M,k T M ,k is not sufficient for M,k ≡ M ,k to hold.
Satisfiability
The satisfiability problem for L(TQCG) is as follows: given a formula ϕ ∈ L(TQCG), does there exist a TQCG M and u ∈ N such that M,u |= ϕ?
Theorem 6
The satisfiability problem for L(TQCG) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Membership of PSPACE follows from the fact that satisfiability for LTL+K n (the fusion of LTL and multi-modal K ) is PSPACE-complete [8] . Any L(TQCG) formula is also a formula of LTL+K n , interpreting sat i as Boolean variable. (The reverse is not the case, of course.) But the relationship is more than merely syntactic: for all ϕ ∈ L(TQCG):
ϕ is L(TQCG)-satisfiable iff ϕ is LTL+K n satisfiable (Notice that we are here quantifying over L(TQCG), formulae, not LTL+K n formulae.) Given an LTL+K n interpretation that satisfies ϕ ∈ L(TQCG), it is straightforward to extract from this a TQCG that satisfies ϕ.
For PSPACE-hardness, we reduce LTL satisfiability [17] . First, let ϕ † denote the result of systematically replacing each Boolean variable p that occurs in LTL formula ϕ with a symbol sat p . Next, we define a transformation τ , from LTL formulae to L(TQCG), as follows:
where ϕ is propositional #τ (ψ) where ϕ = #ψ and # ∈ {¬, g } τ (ψ)#τ (χ) where ϕ = ψ#χ and # ∈ {∨, U } Finally, given an LTL formula ϕ, the L(TQCG) instance ϕ τ we create is:
soundness and completeness proof in [7] in any significant degree. The theorem thus follows immediately from Theorem 3.
Characterizing TQCGs
In this section, we investigate the axiomatic characterisation of various classes of TQCGs. As usual, in saying that a formula scheme ϕ characterises a property P of models, we mean that ϕ is valid in a model M iff M has property P; if only the right-to-left part of this biconditional holds, then we say property P implies ϕ. Also note that for an L(TQCG) formula ϕ, to say that ϕ is valid in a class of models, is the same as saying that * ϕ is valid in that class.
Basic Correspondences
Let h s (C) denote the set of all agents that could possibly be satisfied (not necessarily jointly) by coalition C in state s:
The "h" here is for "happiness": we think of h s (C) as all the agents that C could possibly make happy in s. Thus the semantic property i ∈ h s (C) is a counterpart to the syntactic expression C sat i .
The first property on models that we consider is the persistence of happiness (PH): if coalition C can make i happy in a state s, they can make i happy in the state immediately following s.
We have the following characterisation.
Lemma 4 C sat i → g C sat i characterises PH.
In the same way, we can characterise the persistence of unhappiness: property PU says that if C cannot make i happy in a state s, then they cannot make i happy in the state t that immediately follows s.
Now consider the following two constraints. The first, EH, says that eventually, C will be able to make i happy.
Notice that in the terminology of reactive systems, this is a fairness or response property [11, p.288] .
Lemma 6 ♦ * C sat i characterises EH.
The obvious counterpart to EH is of course the property EU, which states that, eventually, C will be unable to satisfy i.
Lemma 7 ♦ * ¬ C sat i characterises EU.
Combining these properties, we get the following.
Lemma 8 PH and EH together imply ♦ * *
C sat i , while properties PU and EU together imply ♦ * * ¬ C sat i .
Finally, we consider safety properties. The constraint AH says that C can always make i happy, while the constraint AU says that C can never make i happy.
The characterizations are as follows. (Note that there are some obvious implications between these and other properties that we do not list explicitly -e.g., AH implies both EH and PH.) Lemma 9 C sat i characterises AH, and ¬ C sat i characterises AU.
Basic Properties of Choice Sets
Three obvious constraints that we might consider relate to whether or not a particular coalition C has any "real" choices. The first, ECS , says that C never has any choices.
The second says that C always has a meaningful choice.
The third says that C can choose everything.
Lemma 10 Any model that satisfies ECS also satisfies AU, and so ECS implies ¬ C sat i , while any model that satisfies CCS also satisfies AH, and so CCS implies C sat i .
Note that NECS alone does not have any characterization: however, when combined with other properties, below, we will see that it has a role.
Static Goal Sets and Choices
Two other simple properties are that the goal sets for each agent and the choice sets for each coalition are guaranteed to remain unchanged. We get the following two constraints, stating that agent i's goal sets are static (constraint SGS) and that coalition C's choices remain static (SC).
∀s,s ∈ S,(G
Taken separately, there does not seem too much we can say about static goal sets and static choice sets. However, taken together, we get the following.
Lemma 11 Any model satisfying both SGS and SC also satisfies PH and PU, and as a consequence, SGS and SC together imply C sat
Note that we do not immediately derive a characterisation here. It is perfectly well possible that C sat i ↔ g C sat i is true in a model M not just because all agents' goals and all coalitions' choices stay fixed, but because there is an intricate interplay going on between for instance an agent changing some of his goals, while at the same time, the coalition C 'synchronously' changing its options. Note that in our example of Section 3.2 for instance, both (SGS) and (SC) are true for C ={sys} and i = sys, so that, indeed, {sys} sat sys ↔ g {sys} sat sys . On the other hand, taking C ={sys} and i = 1, we don't have (SGS) and (SC), although we still have {sys} sat 1 ↔ g {sys} sat 1 .
Dynamic Goal Sets
There are several properties we can investigate with respect to goal sets. First, suppose that agent i's goal set is guaranteed to monotonically decrease over time. Roughly, this condition means that every agent is guaranteed to get no easier to satisfy over time. Formally, this condition on a model M is defined by the following property.
Lemma 12 Any model satisfying SC and MDGS will satisfy PU, and hence SC and MDGS together imply
Suppose we make this condition is strict, so that an agent i is guaranteed to get strictly harder to satisfy over time. This condition is defined by the following further constraint, in addition to MDGS.
We get the following.
Lemma 13 Any model satisfying SC, MDGS, and SMDGS will also satisfy PU and EU, and
so SC, MDGS, and SMDGS together imply ♦ * * ¬ C sat i .
Now suppose agent i has monotonically increasing goal sets: that is, agent i gets no harder to satisfy over time.
Lemma 14 Any model satisfying both SC and MIGS will satisfy constraint PH, and hence SC and MIGS together imply C sat
The associated strictness constraint is as follows.
We might expect that SC, MIGS, and S MIGS together imply the validity of the formula scheme ♦ * * C sat i , but this is not the case. A counter example is given by a model that satisfies the empty choice set property (ECS ) for coalition C, as described above. If we add the constraint that the choices for C are non-empty (NECS), however, then we get the following.
Lemma 15 Any model that satisfies NECS, SC, MIGS, and S MIGS also satisfies PH and EH, and hence the following formula scheme will be valid in any model satisfying NECS, SC,
MIGS, and S MIGS: ♦ * * C sat i .
Dynamic Choices
We can also consider the ways in which the choices available to coalitions may change over time. Analogously to MIGS and MDGS, we can define properties MICS and MDCS, which say that the sets of choices available to coalition C monotonically increase and decrease respectively.
Notice that taken together, these two conditions imply static choice sets (SC). Alone, the properties do not have any characterisation, but axioms emerge when we make assumptions about goal sets.
Lemma 16 (1) Any model satisfying MICS and SGS will satisfy constraint PH, and hence MICS and SGS together imply C sat i → g C sat i . (2) Any model satisfying MDCS and SGS will satisfy constraint PU, and hence MICS and SGS together imply
The associated strictness condition for increasing choice sets is:
Lemma 17 Any model satisfying MICS, SGS, and S MICS or MICS, MIGS, and S MICS will also satisfy constraints PH and EH, and hence MICS, SGS, and S MICS together imply
The strictness condition for monotonically decreasing choice sets is:
Lemma 18 Any model satisfying MDCS, SGS, and S MDCS or MDCS, MDGS, and S MDCS will also satisfy constraints PU and EU, and hence MDCS, SGS, and S MDCS together imply
♦ * * ¬ C sat i , as do MDCS, MDGS, and S MDCS.
Solution Concepts
In [20] , a range of different solution concepts were defined for QCGs. It should be clear that many of the solution concepts of [20] can be characterised via formulae of L(QCG). For example, a basic solution concept is that of a successful coalition -one that has a choice available such that this choice satisfies all its members [20, p.47] . We can characterise this via a predicate succ(C), as follows.
Similarly, the notion of a minimal coalition (one such that no subset of the coalition is successful [20, p .51]) may be captured as follows.
Thus the core of a coalition being non-empty [20, p.54 ] may be captured as follows:
The idea of agent i being a veto player for agent j [20, p.57 ] is defined by:
And finally, the idea of a coalition being mutually dependent [20, p.58 ] is captured as follows:
veto(i,j)
How might these concepts be extended into the temporal dimension of TQCGs and L(TQCG)? It should first be clear that each concept has four different temporal versions, corresponding to prefixing the formula characterising it with one of the following four, increasingly powerful temporal operators:
♦ ♦ ♦
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Thus, for example, ♦succ(C) means that coalition C are successful infinitely often -no matter which time point we pick, there will be a subsequent time point at which C are successful. (Using the terminology of reactive systems [11] , we might then say that C are hence fairly successful.) Similarly, a temporally strong form of coalitional stability is captured by the formula cne(A): if this formula is satisfied in a TQCG, then, it can be argued, the only coalition that will ever form is the grand coalition. It is potentially more interesting, however, to study a richer interplay between temporal and QCG dimensions. For example, from agent i's point of view, perhaps the only really interesting issue is whether at every time point there is some stable coalition, containing this agent.
tstable(i) ≡

C⊆A:i∈C cne(C)
From the point of view of a coalition C, which seeks to form, the notion of a stable government seems relevant: a stable government is a coalition that can always satisfy its "electorate".
This can of course be strengthened, requiring C to in addition be an internally stable coalition.
sg (C) ≡ (cne(C)∧ C ( i∈A sat i )) With respect to mutual dependence, one possibility, captured by the formula md(C), is that a coalition is always mutually dependent. However, we can capture a weaker type of mutual dependence as follows:
We draw two conclusions. The first is that the language L(TQCG) is well suited to capturing such solution concepts: it makes it possible to express elegantly concepts that would be difficult to understand were they expressed at the semantic level. The second is that extending QCGs into the temporal dimension adds an entirely new level of richness to their structure, which as these examples suggest, demands further study.
Conclusion
Qualitative Coalitional Games were introduced in [20] to model cooperative scenarios in which agents are concerned with achieving goals, rather than maximising utility. Thus rather than associating a utility to every choice, the emphasis is on satisfaction of agents, which is triggered or not by the choices made by coalitions.
The logical analysis of such games underlines the idea that we have a basic and simple notion of coalitional games with QCGs: a natural language for it gives rise to an axiomatisation that is closely related to the simplest modal logic, K. We established several technical results for this language, and were then able to lift them to the domain of temporal QCGs.
There are many possible directions for further research. First, the properties of TQGCs that we characterised in Section 4 are only the most straightforward. Even in static games, there are other interesting conditions to be investigated (see the monotonicity property mentioned in Section 2, for example). Second, our way of temporalising QCGs also only reflects a simple case. It would be interesting to add temporal structure to the games themselves, and reason about what agents can achieve over time, by applying suitable strategies, rather than making "one-shot choices". In addition, finite horizon versions of TQCGs might also be worth investigating: for example, if an agent is only concerned about being satisfied once, then it might be prepared to join a coalition that does not satisfy it throughout a game, as long as, in the final state of the game, the coalition does satisfy it. Such strategising is not possible or appropriate in infinite horizon games.
